EPISODE: 040 - GRENFELL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

BYTNAR - TALKS

EPISODE: 040 - GRENFELL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

This episode is for people who want to know more about the Grenfell Report.

You should like this episode if you ask yourself questions like:

• What are the key lessons learned from the Grenfell Tower tragedy report?

• What is the Building Safety Act and how does it address lessons from the Grenfell Tower fire?

• How did systemic failures contribute to the Grenfell Tower fire disaster?

• What were the issues with the materials used in Grenfell Tower that led to the tragedy?

• How did the fire safety regulations fail during the Grenfell Tower fire?

• What role did manufacturers, professionals, and regulatory bodies play in the Grenfell Tower fire?

• What are the main recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to prevent future disasters?

LET'S TALK ABOUT YOUR PROJECT

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This is Bytnar Talks: The Engineer Takes on Construction – Episode 40.

Hi, I'm Piotr Bytnar. Each day I help my clients plan and design building projects through Bytnar Limited, a consulting Chartered Structural Engineers practice. My biggest passion, and the cornerstone on which I've built my business, is finding clever solutions for construction projects.

I am a Chartered Structural Engineer and a budding software developer, so you can rest assured that I will strive to talk about the best practices and the use of new technologies in the industry. And if you're embarking on a construction project or are involved in planning, designing, and building the world around us, you'll find this podcast useful..

Grenfell Report: Lessons Learned

Hi guys, and welcome to Bytnar Talks, your favorite podcast on all matters of architecture, engineering, and construction.

It is Thursday, the 19th of December, 2024, and I'm here back with you with the 40th episode of this podcast. I am now back in the room where it all started a year ago, when I decided—when I decided—this is the time to get out there and start talking about matters of architecture, engineering, and construction—the matters that are closest to my heart.

This will be the last episode of this year—year 2024—and I am glad I could have delivered all 40 episodes for you, covering some heavy subjects with content lasting for more than a day.

Today I will talk about something important. I will conclude the year with the lessons learned from the Grenfell tragedy. In this episode, I will do the gist list of matters concluded in the report. No BS. No special commentary—well, almost. Simple, hard truth. Sear, cold, and straight up.

So brace yourself, Dorothy, as this train is leaving to the truth land. So, without further ado, let's get and dive straight into it.

Lessons Learned (as they appear in the published report – Overview, containing Chapter 2: Executive Summary, and Chapter 113: Recommendations)

Lesson number one:The path leading to the disaster was a culmination of decades of neglect in regards to the use of combustible materials in external walls. Neglect by the government and the institutions that lead and control the industry, and which were well aware of the risk, yet chose not to act to regulate the use.

The lesson came from:

• the fire of Knowsley Heights in 1991

• the results of the Environment Transport Select Committee in 1999

• results of large-scale testing of aluminium composite panels in 2001

• a number of reports of Class 0 designation being inappropriate

• reports of fires internationally using such materials

• reports about the improper interpretations of Approved Document B

• continuation of the use of wrong materials

The department dealing with building regulations and oversight of Approved Document B was poorly run by incompetent people.

The BRE—formerly the Fire Research Station—had been privatized, and the scope of their advice minimized or unduly silenced.

The government bodies were not keen on doing work to improve, dismissing or defending against recommendations—like the recommendations of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fire Safety, and all coroners involved in 2009’s Lakanal House fire.

The drive was for deregulation, with little regard to fire safety.

Lesson number two:The Building Research Establishment showed the loosening of the standards through the 1990s, leading to inconsistent delivery of their assessments and industry-conforming, commercially driven behavior, leading to their privatization in 1997.

Lesson number three:Systemic failure driven by dishonest conduct of rainscreen cladding and insulation manufacturers and resellers.

The British Board of Agrément (BBA), Local Authority Building Control (LABC), failed to scrutinize their claims, and UKAS failed to scrutinize them in turn.

Lesson four:Manufacturers not only concealed the information. These, as named in the report, are Arconic Architectural Products, producers of aluminium composite material—meaning plastic foam-filled sandwich panels with aluminium skins. The plastic foam used was Reynobond PE 55.

Despite the fires in Dubai and regulatory changes in other countries, the manufacturers chose to push its use in less regulated markets—and such is the British market.

The next in line of dishonest manufacturers is Celotex, that misled the market with claims of suitability of their RS5000 insulation, obfuscating the fact that the test it underwent was a system test to BS 8414, where the panels had a fire-resistant magnesium oxide board placed in critical positions—rigged to satisfy the test criteria.

Also Kingspan, with their K15 insulation, were the next market snake oil traders—manipulating the standards-issuing institutions and concealing facts, propagating misinformation.

The cavity barrier manufacturer Siderise has not been found to act dishonestly, but their products were used in situations to which they were not tested to. Their marketing was found disconcerting.

Lesson number five:Professional bodies' conduct, starting with the British Board of Agrément, whose conduct was found not entirely independent, not rigorous, or rigorously applied. They sought to bring in and maintain customers rather than discharge their duties.

Local Authority Building Control (LABC) was found to be incompetent and negligent in the processes of material certification.

The National House Building Council (NHBC) was found to serve their own agenda instead of serving the public interest—as did the Building Research Establishment (BRE).

Last but not least is the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), that also showed lack of professionalism and a complacent attitude toward discharging their duties. This, combined with little enforcement capability, kept the institution at the level of yet another glorified paper-pusher.

Lesson number six:The Tenant Management Organization (TMO) was found lacking the governance and customer service. Staff attitudes, and a poor repair service were identified as constant themes of the investigation. The organization has been failing miserably throughout the years.

Lesson number seven:The Tenant Management Organization and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) were responsible for the fire safety of the building and failed in their duty. RBKC failed to control TMO, which in turn was incompetent in their duties and showed utter disregard for property and human safety.

Two individuals were named:

• TMO CEO Mr. Robert Black

• Self-proclaimed fire assessor Mr. Carl Stokes

Shame on you people.

Lesson number eight:The industry appears to consider meeting the requirements B3 and B4 as sufficient for compartmentalization, hence delay or withhold evacuation of the building.

Lesson number nine:The building requirements are performance-based, yet the prescriptive reading of the Approved Document B leads to the perception of the Approved Document as the industry gospel—which it is not.

Lesson number ten:Improper procedures, race to the bottom, blamey lack of research and development, and companies relying solely on existing relationships without scrutiny—is the way to disaster.

Companies named in the report are:

• Construction Consultant: Artelia

• The architect for the project: Studio E

• Main contractor: Rydon

• Cladding subcontractor: Harley

• Metal Sheathing: Arconic

• Facade manufacturer: CEP Architectural Facades

• Fire safety assessor: Exovia

• Building control for the project: RBKC

Lesson number eleven:Push-forward attitude of all involved. The industry recognizes the necessity for an iterative approach to reach best outcomes, yet racing down with pricing in the current climate means it is seldom the case—as was here.

All involved showed the prevalent industry behavior: minimum effort, push forward. As long as the process moved forward, there were no stops included—like the one with the fire strategy done by Exovia, that remained in its draft form.

Lesson number twelve:Lack of site visits led to lack of understanding of the building form.

Lesson number thirteen:Lack of design competency by the main contractor led to the wrong selection and use of materials.

Lesson number fourteen:The design of the building in this case looked more like an exercise in simply providing the minimum to satisfy regulatory stops.

My personal observation is that such an approach is prevailing in the AEC (Architecture, Engineering, Construction) industry, ever since my first contact with it—so supposedly for the last 40 years, also since the last change of the building regulation regime...

Lesson number 15:Commercial clients tend not to scrutinize the work they commission. If they do, it's usually to the degree of budgetary values—and no more. That is partially due to their own inherent incompetence.

Lesson number 16:Continuous development, training, and benchmarking of the workforce is somehow lacking—including in safety-critical operations like that of the London Fire Brigade.

Lesson number 17:There appears to be no critically-thinking, competent leadership on the local and governmental levels that would drive safe operation of the country, local authorities, or individual buildings. Failings in aspects of response, communication strategy, and coordinated action have been noted by the report.

Lesson number 18:The industry is over-reliant on the certification of materials, without analyzing the actual behavior of the materials in the given scenario or approaching design decisions holistically.

Lesson number 19:Over-reliance on experience and blind following of company procedures and standards—or lack thereof—as opposed to individual research, training, and professional development, leads to wrong or no decisions on projects.

Lesson number 20:A safe building relies on good design, choice of suitable materials, and sound methods of construction implemented by people with appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience—all of which were somehow missing in this case.

Lesson number 21:The regulatory arrangements are too complicated and fragmented. Fragmentation has been identified as leading to inefficiencies and obstacles to effective regulations.

I would go as far as to say that it's not only a problem with legislation and regulatory arrangements—it is also a very big issue in the delivery of projects.

Now, let's get to some of the recommendations given.

It is generally recommended to:

• Unify control over construction and safe development under one body with an appropriate, practicing, and competent advisory board.

• Review the meaning of the "higher-risk building".

• Update Approved Document B.

• Invite fresh minds to the process of continuous review, including academia and practicing professionals.

• Ensure that fire safety strategy is made by qualified people at Gateway 2 and 3.

• Recognize the inefficiencies of the current testing regimes for cladding materials or ventilated systems and devise new approaches.

• Require that a construction regulator certifies products to be used in construction—and that such certificates be accompanied by the setup and test results of the experiments.

• Implement regulation of the status of fire engineers and create an appropriate institution to support it.

• Ensure that architects are better trained, and that contractors of higher-risk buildings are licensed.

• Ensure building control approvers are guarded from conflicts of interest—preferably by a national body.

• Give designers free access to design data, preferably driven by a national body.

• Subject operation and building regulations to industry recommendations—with open access by the public to verify whether the regulator acts on this.

• Ensure fire risk assessors are accredited.

These are the main points for the industry.

More recommendations were directed at the local and national level to enhance firefighting efforts, and the resilience and response of local governments.

So this is it, folks.Unapologetic, straight-up conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations of the Grenfell Report.

We are now all looking forward to the end of 2024 and the beginning of the new 2025.

One thing is for certain—in the new year, I, through and with my business Bytnar Limited, am looking forward to continuing on the path of the improvement of myself and the operation of my business, and with it, the wider industry.

I hope to work with you in the coming year, and to be useful with the delivery of new content.

I hope you enjoyed this episode.If you have any questions, reach out to me on LinkedIn or send me an email.I'm more than happy to help you out.

At Bytnar, we deal with planning, designing, and managing your projects, and we are always glad to facilitate a free initial consultation to steer you in the right direction.

Visit www.bytnar.co.uk and reach out to us—whether your question is “Can you help me with this project?” or “What should I do?”—we will be able to give you a piece of non-obligatory advice.

At Bytnar, we help our clients design and execute their dream homes or investments.If your building is falling apart, we can also help investigate the reason behind it and provide you with an appropriate strategy, design, and specifications for the repair.

Thank you again for listening.Please voice your opinions. I'm waiting for you on LinkedIn, and I want to hear from you.

See you next week.Bytnar Designs the World Around You.

Toodloo!

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Piotr Bytnar BEng (Hons) MSc CEng MIStructE

Chartered Structural Engineer who deals with the Architecture of buildings. His Master's Studies led him to an in-depth understanding of risk and contract arrangements in construction as well as specialist knowledge in soil mechanics.

He and his team help homeowners and property developers to design and deliver construction projects reducing waste in time and the cost. He believes that the construction project is an iterative process that can be well managed and it is best managed if all the aspects of the project definition and management are dealt with in-house or coordinated by one organisation. His team works to all stages of RIBA and ISTRUCTE stages of work and enables contractors to deliver projects on-site providing risk evaluations, methodologies for execution of works and temporary works designs.

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